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Efforts to „modernize‟ the clinical workforce of the English National Health Service have sought 
to reconfigure the responsibilities of professional groups in pursuit of more effective, joined-up 
service provision.  Such efforts have met resistance from professions eager to protect their 
jurisdictions, deploying legitimacy claims familiar from the insights of the sociology of 
professions.  Yet to date few studies of professional boundaries have grounded these insights in 
the specific context of policy challenges to the inter- and intra-professional division of labour, in 
relation the medical profession and other health-related occupations. 
In this paper we address this gap by considering the experience of newly instituted general 
practitioners (family physicians) with a special interest (GPSIs) in genetics, introduced to improve 
genetics knowledge and practice in primary care.  Using qualitative data from four comparative 
case studies, we discuss how an established intra-professional division of labour within 
medicine—between clinical geneticists and GPs—was opened, negotiated and reclosed in these 
sites.  We discuss the contrasting attitudes towards the nature of genetics knowledge and its 
application of GPSIs and geneticists, and how these were used to advance conflicting visions of 
what the nascent GPSI role should involve.  In particular, we show how the claims to knowledge 
of geneticists and GPSIs interacted with wider policy pressures to produce a rather more 
conservative redistribution of power and responsibility across the intra-professional boundary 
than the rhetoric of modernization might suggest. 
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Introduction 
Traditional ways of organizing health care and other public services are coming under pressure 
from governments globally, who see them as increasingly ill-suited to contemporary economic 
and social exigencies.  Strategies to reform health-service organization include the introduction of 
markets, attempts to improve collaboration between providers, and efforts at workforce 
reconfiguration.  Alongside wider organizational changes, Labour governments in the United 
Kingdom (UK) since 1997 have sought to „modernize‟ the workforce of National Health Service 
(NHS) in this way.  A constant theme of policy has been the expansion of the clinical workforce 
and the reconfiguration of responsibilities, epitomized in the subtitle of the Department of 
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Health‟s HR in the NHS Plan: More Staff Working Differently (Department of Health, 2002).  New 
grades and roles have been introduced, and policymakers have been keen to promote a focus on 
staff „competencies‟ over traditional professional cleavages in the division of clinical 
responsibilities. 
In a system where shifts in the responsibilities of one profession inevitably impact on those 
of others (Nancarrow & Borthwick, 2005), these reforms have had a mixed response from 
professional bodies (see, e.g., Lancet, 2007).  The sociological literature teaches us that 
professions tend to defend their jurisdictions fiercely, and respond to incursions by reasserting 
the legitimacy of existing boundaries (Abbott, 1988).  With exceptions, however, the literature on 
the health professions concentrates on potential, rather than actual, shifts in professional 
boundaries: it considers legitimacy claims in isolation, rather than in relation to specific challenges 
to the professional division of labour.  In this paper, we examine the negotiation of professional 
jurisdiction at the micro-level, in the specific context of pilot genetics services introduced to 
create more joined-up provision for patients by bridging the boundary between specialist genetics 
and primary care.  Our findings thus relate not only to the legitimatory strategies deployed by 
those involved—the mainstay of the sociology of the medical profession—but also to the 
interaction of these with wider power structures in the modernizing NHS to create new (or 
reproduce existing) professional boundaries.  Our study, then, is as much about the renegotiation 
of professional boundaries as the legitimation of existing jurisdictions.  Furthermore, we address 
another lacuna in the sociology of the medical profession, by focusing on an intra-professional 
division within medicine—between newly appointed general practitioners (family physicians) with 
a special interest (GPSIs) in genetics and existing specialist genetics consultants—rather than the 
boundary between physicians and other professions.  Given the ubiquity of the division between 
primary care-based family physicians and hospital-based specialists globally (e.g. Shortell, Gillies, 
Anderson, Erickson & Mitchell, 2000), and efforts in the UK and elsewhere to move knowledge 
and power towards primary-care practitioners, the outcome of this negotiation is of wide interest. 
In the next section we review the literature on the health professions, noting the potential 
for reconfiguration of inter- and intra-professional boundaries in the face of external and internal 
pressures.  Following this, we consider the efforts of recent British governments to „modernize‟ 
the NHS—which reflect internationally prevalent aspirations to promote knowledge sharing and 
mitigate boundaries in public-service delivery—and the barriers faced by such attempts.  After 
grounding these generalities in the specifics of our research, we present our findings and discuss 
their implications.  Considering the legitimatory discourses deployed by GPSIs and geneticists, 
and highlighting the institutional forces which influence the effectiveness of these in practice, we 
show how a new division of labour and knowledge is established—albeit a rather more 
conservative one than the rhetoric of NHS modernization might suggest. 
Professional boundaries, health and medicine 
The development and maintenance of the system of professions is well documented in the 
sociological literature.  Abbott (1988) describes the construction of jurisdictions over which 
professions claim exclusive authority and defend from competing claims from neighbouring 
professions.  Though these may result in change, established professions tend to cede their core 
work only reluctantly, using an armoury of techniques to defend their territory.  By making claims 
to scientific or specialist expertise, for example, dominant professions are able to set the terms of 
reference of such territorial battles, so that challengers are immediately weakened by the need to 
appeal to the discursive norms of the dominant professions (Larson, 1990).  Monopoly over the 
techniques and competences needed to practise in a given domain, and carefully guarded entry to 
a profession, assist the endurance of professional power (Freidson, 1970).  The accrual of status 
by a profession, then, is a process “in which power and persuasive rhetoric are of greater 
importance than the objective character of knowledge, training, and work” (Freidson, 1970, 
p.79). 
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Medicine represents the quintessential profession for authors on this subject, within the 
field of health and beyond (see, e.g., Freidson, 1970; Harrison, Hunter, Marnoch & Pollitt, 1992; 
Coburn & Willis, 2000).  Despite recurrent predictions of medicine‟s imminent 
deprofessionalization or proletarianization, its standing has remained assured, and in the UK, 60 
years of employment by the state has little diminished the status of hospital doctors.  However, as 
commentators either side of the Atlantic have noted (Freidson, 1984; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000), 
the development of new technologies and managerial forms has altered the character of the 
profession, and particularly its internal differentiation.  Freidson (1984) notes the emergence of a 
„knowledge elite‟ within the medical profession, deploying its expertise to determine standards of 
conduct for lower-status strata.  McKinlay and Marceau (2008) go as far as to predict the near-
future disappearance of the primary-care physician in the United States.  In the UK, Harrison and 
Ahmad (2000) echo Freidson‟s theme in their description of the rise of „scientific-bureaucratic 
medicine‟, whereby new trends, such as health-technology assessment and evidence-based 
medicine—as well as managerialization—contribute to stratification within the profession, so that 
“for the ordinary medical clinician, autonomy has been eroded” (p.138). 
Even if the overall status of the profession seems assured, the influence of these shifts does 
seem to auger some reconfiguration.  Fragmentation within the medical profession might lead to 
increasing competition between its segments (or strata).  Changes to the organization of primary 
care may see GPs seeking to diversify their interests, reorientating their provision to avoid the 
extinction anticipated by McKinlay and Marceau (2008).  The rise of managerialism and the 
advent of new information technologies, meanwhile, pose a particular threat to medical expertise 
across specialities, which rests on both the rationalization of knowledge and the claim 
(crystallized in the notion of „clinical judgement‟) that it is irreducible, transcending its constituent 
parts.  For Reed (1996, p.578), the key to defending such expert knowledge from the advance of 
these challenges to its distinctiveness is 
to strike the right—i.e. inevitably shifting—political balance between indeterminacy and 
formalization of knowledge and skill as a prerequisite to constructing expert power bases 
and action domains that will stand the test of time. 
In other words, to protect medicine from deprofessionalization—and from other professions 
(and specialities) encroaching upon its territory, assisted by managerial and technological 
interventions—requires a politically informed defence of the qualities that mark it out as 
particular. 
On the macro-level, there is a considerable literature considering this kind of work in 
action, exploring the role of, inter alia, professional bodies in defending existing epistemic and 
jurisdictional boundaries (Coburn, 1993; Evans, 2003; Zetka, 2001; Stevens, Diederiks, Grit & 
Horst, 2007; Mizrachi & Shuval, 2005).  On the micro-level, research is more limited.  There is a 
considerable literature offering rich insights into strategies deployed by professions in legitimating 
their jurisdictional boundaries (e.g. Norris, 2001; Foley & Faircloth, 2003; Hibbert, Hanratty, 
May, Mair, Litva & Capewell, 2003; Mizrachi & Shuval, 2005), but relatively little of this studies 
these legitimatory strategies in relation to specific pressures of technology, policy or 
managerialism (Lupton, 1997; Sanders & Harrison, 2008).  Rarer still are studies examining the 
reconstruction of professional boundaries by actors on the ground in the face of technological, 
managerial or policy changes which disrupt the existing division of jurisdictional responsibility 
(recent exceptions include Mclaughlin & Webster, 1998; Charles-Jones, Latimer & May, 2003; 
McDonald, Harrison, Checkland, Campbell & Roland, 2007).  Analyses like these ground abstract 
proclamations by individuals about their professions in the practical realities of the renegotiation 
of disrupted boundaries between actors, and thereby give a picture of how such discourses are 
drawn upon in seeking substantive, local advances for one professional group over another. 
Another relatively underresearched area is the intra-, rather than inter-, professional 
boundaries within occupations, despite the potential importance of professional fragmentation 
noted above (again, there are exceptions: Zetka, 2001; McDonald et al., 2007; Sanders & 
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Harrison, 2008).  Differential status between medical specialities has a long history (Klein, 2006), 
and the split between GPs and specialists is a particularly entrenched one.  Recent policy 
impetuses in the NHS, though, have led to new tensions at the boundaries between these 
subprofessions.  Policies in the 1990s aimed at empowering GPs as commissioners of care in an 
internal market represented the beginning of efforts to „shift the balance of power‟ away from 
hospitals, advanced under Labour governments since 1997.  Further subsequent changes (e.g. 
Secretary of State for Health, 2006) have allowed GPs themselves to provide primary-care-based 
alternatives to hospital admission. 
The introduction of GPSIs exemplifies these shifts in NHS provision, which transform not 
only the relationship between generalists and specialists, but also, potentially, the division of 
labour, and hence established jurisdictional boundaries.  As Sanders and Harrison (2008, p.305) 
argue, developments such as GPSIs “can be seen as the opening-up of discursive fields related to 
professional work” where previously jurisdictional closure seemed relatively stable.  Our study 
represents an enquiry into this kind of „opening up‟, and also the „closing down‟ that must follow, 
as those involved renegotiate jurisdictions thrown asunder by policy.  As we shall see, though, 
this process of renegotiation is structured not only by discursive deliberations between GPSIs 
and specialists, but also by various, somewhat conflicting, institutional forces governing the 
NHS‟s intra-professional logic.  Let us now consider this institutional backdrop, in the context of 
„modernizing‟ ambitions aimed at its reconfiguration. 
GPSIs and NHS modernization: aims and obstacles 
The „modernization‟ of public services, including the NHS, pursued by successive Labour 
governments since 1997, is a multifaceted, and to some extent contradictory, process.  There are 
tensions, for example, between its efforts simultaneously to promote conformity to centrally 
prescribed targets, competition between providers in a quasi-market, and collaboration between 
those same providers through more networked provision (see, e.g., Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006).  
The reconfiguration of the NHS workforce is central to „modernization‟, and exemplifies these 
tensions.  Seeking to “build jobs round patients, rather than round professions” (Department of 
Health, 2002, p.7), the NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2000) and subsequent policy 
documents introduced new roles and redistributed responsibilities among existing ones.  Among 
the new roles set out were „specialist GPs‟ (later rebadged GPSIs), who would take referrals from 
fellow GPs, offer diagnostic and treatment services, and provide leadership across the primary 
care community, and in relation to the efforts of primary care trusts (PCTs) (the bodies 
responsible for providing NHS community services and commissioning most hospital-based 
services) to reshape provision in their clinical field (Secretary of State for Health, 2000).  GPSIs 
proliferated in various fields, such as ophthalmology, orthopaedics and dermatology.  Their value 
was affirmed in subsequent policies, as a means of providing care closer to home, and improving 
deficient provision by offering alternatives to conventional referral to consultant-led clinics (see, 
e.g., Secretary of State for Health, 2006, pp.132-3). 
GPSI services thus become, potentially at least, competitors to established, hospital-based 
services.  Yet they are also reliant on specialists within those services for training and, often, 
accreditation.  As such they are at the crux of the tension between collaboration and competition.  
The limited extant literature on GPSIs suggests a complementary, rather than substituting, role in 
relation to existing consultant-led services (Boggis & Cornford, 2007; Nocon & Leese, 2004), 
though even then, hospital-based services may suffer if straightforward cases (which may be 
beneficial financially and for training) are treated elsewhere. 
There is, then, potential conflict in the negotiation of GPSI roles.  GPSIs would seem to 
have the momentum of policy behind them, but specialists retain knowledge and power which 
they may not wish to share.  The organization and management literature highlights potential 
barriers presented by sectoral interests and subcultures, like those considered here, to effective 
knowledge sharing (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001).  However, as Kernick and Mannion (2005, 
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p.909) note, detailed research on how “mechanisms, such as [GPSI] clinics, interact with 
contextual factors, such as local professional networks, history and culture, to bring about unique 
outcomes,” has so far been lacking (cf. Jones, Rosen, Tomlin, Cavanagh, & Oxley, 2006).  We 
now seek to address this gap, considering the negotiation of roles in the grounded, empirical 
context of the introduction of GPSIs in genetics in four pilot sites. 
Empirical field and methods 
GPSIs in genetics were piloted as part of a wider programme of genetics services outlined in the 
white paper, Our Inheritance, Our Future (Secretary of State for Health, 2003).  This set out the 
government‟s ambition to „mainstream‟ genetics provision into other clinical specialities and 
primary care.  Existing genetics services were generally provided on a regional basis through 
tertiary-care clinical genetics departments in hospitals, comprising a range of staff including 
consultant clinical geneticists (medically trained doctors with four years of specialist training in 
clinical genetics), junior doctors at various stages of specialist training and genetic counsellors 
(non-medical specialists, often nurses by background, in genetic conditions who diagnose and 
advise patients at risk of inherited conditions).  This set-up, with its organizational separation of 
clinical genetics from other specialities and from primary care, was seen as increasingly 
inappropriate given advances in genetics knowledge heralded by the Human Genome project 
among other developments.  The aim of the white paper, and the pilots, was to facilitate 
collaboration between specialist clinical-genetics departments and the rest of the NHS, ahead of 
the „genetics revolution‟.  This would equip the latter with the knowledge to deal with the coming 
rise in genetics-related inquiries and referrals, while specialists could focus on complex cases. 
Twenty-eight pilots were funded under the programme, including 10 GPSI in genetics projects.  
The GPSI in genetics projects provided funding for GPs to take up to two days per week out of 
their normal practice as primary-care physicians, over a period of up to three years, to gain a 
degree of specialist knowledge in genetics and use this to provide a community-based, 
supplementary genetics service to their colleagues in primary care in the local area, including 
leadership around genetics issues for PCTs, education for GPs and other primary-care-based 
clinical staff, and, potentially, a low-level clinical service based in the community. 
This article arises from the national evaluation which accompanied the pilot programme.  
This involved qualitative case-study work comparing 11 of the pilot sites, including four GPSI 
sites.  The evaluation used intra- and inter-case analysis to illuminate key differences of context 
and mechanism that give rise to differences of outcome, enabling generalization through process 
analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Cases were therefore theoretically sampled, following preliminary 
interviews with stakeholders in each pilot, on the basis of various factors of context and process 
seen as likely to influence outcomes (e.g. clinical field in which service was to be provided; 
anticipated function of service (clinical, educational); degree to which relationships between key 
actors within the site were already established; demographic characteristics of area served in 
terms of socio-economic and ethnic profile) to provide a varied sample that covered the breadth 
of contexts and processes of the pilot programme.  In relation to the GPSI sites specifically, as 
we shall see below, the key criteria were the anticipated function of the service and the degree to 
which relationships were established.  In each GPSI site in-depth interviews were conducted with 
key stakeholders.  In all four sites, these included the GPSIs themselves and clinical geneticists in 
the relevant regional clinical-genetics departments, who were responsible for providing training, 
negotiating the division of responsibilities with the GPSIs, and who took on a supervisory, 
clinical-governance role in relation where GPSIs were engaged in clinical activities.  Across the 
sites, interviewees also variously included managers in primary care, managers of clinical-genetics 
departments, local service commissioners and clinicians in other areas involved with the GPSI 
projects.  The interviews explored issues around developing the GPSI role, challenges 
encountered in implementation, and the results of this, in terms of the role carved out for the 
service and its sustainability.  Interviews were transcribed in full, following which each of the 
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authors undertook, independently, an iterative analysis process, rereading and coding transcripts 
and generating themes.  This was followed by discussions among the authors, during which we 
refined our analytical themes, ensuring inter-researcher reliability of interpretation. 
In addition to the 10 preliminary interviews, across the four sites we conducted 24 
interviews, and also interviewed a Department of Health policy lead for GPSIs in genetics.  This 
figure includes follow-up interviews with the GPSIs themselves at the end of the pilot period 
(around 18 months after initial interviews), at which we discussed progress towards goals, 
reflected on issues raised in earlier interviews, and considered whether their services would be 
sustained beyond the pilot period (i.e. with local money from host PCTs).  This provided a 
longitudinal dimension to our understanding of the negotiation of the GPSI role in each site.  
Additionally, some of the seven non-GPSI case-study sites included geneticists who were 
involved with other GPSIs in genetics, and we included data derived from these interviews in our 
analysis.  In the results section, we label our four case study sites A to D, denoting interview 
excerpts from respondents in those sites accordingly; data from respondents from outside these 
four sites are also identified as such. 
Results 
We present our findings under three headings.  Under „Negotiating a role‟, we set out the plans of 
GPSIs in each site, and how these were negotiated with geneticists.  „Delimiting the GPSI 
knowledge base‟ considers the divergent views of those involved about exactly what kind of 
knowledge GPSIs could accumulate and put into practice in their „sub-specialist‟ roles, and the 
role this implied vis-à-vis their specialist peers.  „Towards jurisdictional closure‟ looks at how such 
divergent discourses were reconciled, as boundaries between the sub-professions were reasserted. 
Negotiating a role 
In contrast to GPSI initiatives in other clinical fields, the brief prepared for GPs interested in 
applying for funding to become GPSIs in genetics was open about the role envisaged.  With a 
considerable emphasis on „soft‟, non-clinical skills such as leadership, negotiation and teaching, 
the principal role set out was as a conduit for knowledge sharing between specialists and primary-
care-based practitioners.  The possibility was left open, though, of clinical-service provision, of 
the intermediate kind commonly provided by GPSIs in other fields.  In their initial bids for 
funding, all but one (Site B) of the GPSIs studied included plans for such provision, either later 
in the pilot period (Sites A and C) or immediately (Site D).  All four had plans for educational 
work, disseminating genetics knowledge among their primary-care peers. 
The role for these first GPSIs in genetics, then, was open to interpretation by the GPSIs 
themselves, in collaboration with local stakeholders—though in all four cases, it was the GPSIs 
who led this process.  They largely struggled to engage PCT managers, for whom genetics was 
not a priority: Site A‟s PCT‟s medical director, for example, candidly admitted that “there 
probably hasn‟t been enough leadership from the PCT.”  Specialist geneticists, though, were 
proactive in engaging with GPSIs, especially those with plans for clinical services.  Concerned at 
the prospect of clinical-genetics services provided on their patch but outside their control, 
geneticists sought to discuss with GPSIs the question of their clinical role, and how this would fit 
in with existing provision.  In Site D, early consultation was somewhat lacking, as both geneticist 
and GPSI admitted: 
“[After the GPSI was funded] he came to see us and asked how we felt this should happen, 
and it was really only then that his ambitions for this became clear.  There was quite a lot of 
conflict at that time about what he wanted to do and what we felt it would be appropriate 
for him to do clinically.” (Geneticist, Site D) 
“They felt slightly threatened by what I was trying to do, in terms of might I be competing 
for patients, trying to create an alternative service, which has never been my intention. […] 
As months go by we can see what our different roles are and how we complement each 
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other.” (GPSI, Site D) 
As we shall see, though, the geneticists in Site D retained considerable concerns about this 
GPSI‟s clinical service. 
Elsewhere, consultations between GPSIs and geneticists were more productive.  In 
designing an educational project for local primary-care practitioners, Site B‟s GPSI consulted 
widely to formulate an intervention that would be useful to geneticists and primary care alike.  In 
Site A, meanwhile, the GPSI and geneticists spent considerable time discussing the question of 
the appropriate role for the GPSI.  She had planned a clinical service providing triage, and 
dealing with lower-risk patients in certain, relatively common, genetic disorders, but for the local 
geneticists, there was concern over the value and viability of such a service: 
“We didn‟t see any great advantage in having [her] as a GP doing lots of genetics clinics. 
[…] It wouldn‟t have fitted in with what we‟re doing, and so as we set out through 
discussion early on, it became clear that the sensible thing was for the first bit of her work 
to be to establish whether or not there was a need for her, or whether in reality we should 
simply say, „Well that was a nice idea, but thank you and goodbye‟.” (Geneticist, Site A) 
The GPSI here recognized the importance of negotiating a mutually agreeable role with the 
geneticists: 
“I‟ve had a number of sessions with [the geneticist quoted above] and we decided I actually 
needed to look carefully at whether to set up clinics or not, [and at the question of] a useful 
and effective way to use my time, because I don‟t want to be doing the same work as a 
genetic counsellor. […] So with the clinics, I‟ve decided to hold off […] and at the 
moment, I‟m concentrating on education.” (GPSI, Site A) 
Despite her plans for a clinical component, the GPSI here acceded to the geneticists‟ view that an 
educational intervention would be more appropriate—perhaps because she was persuaded that 
this would indeed be a more beneficial package of work, but also because, as she put it, “I want 
this to be a sustainable service—I didn‟t want to jump in and say, „Oh yeah, I‟ll do this, I‟ll do 
that‟.  I‟ve tried to spend a lot of time networking before committing to too much.”  In Site C, 
meanwhile, the GPSI did provide a clinical service, but following negotiations with the clinical-
genetics department, this took place under its auspices, so that cases were triaged by geneticists, 
and appropriate patients referred to the GPSI, rather than the GPSI acting as an intermediary 
between referring GPs and the clinical-genetics department. 
Negotiations in Sites A and C saw something of a redrawing of the GPSIs‟ plans for 
clinical provision, then, while in Site D, the GPSI set up a clinic despite the trepidation of local 
geneticists.  What precisely was the nature of the geneticists‟ concerns?  We consider this next. 
Delimiting the GPSI knowledge base 
A core source of unease common to geneticists across sites was that clinical-genetics knowledge 
was not amenable to adoption by GPSIs whose involvement was limited to one or two days a 
week.  One geneticist who related to a GPSI in a non-case-study site outlined the difficulty: 
“There‟s too much in genetics for them to do the work of a consultant because they can 
never be trained to that level, because they would have to do paediatrics, adult medicine 
and four years‟ training—then they might as well be consultants!  So you can only train 
them to the level of a genetic counsellor, and then they make very expensive genetic 
counsellors.” 
More than this, though, there was a sense that genetics knowledge was not something that could 
easily be divided into discrete components that might be apprehended by GPSIs to practise.  The 
limited time spent by GPSIs in acquiring knowledge was, for geneticists, insufficient for a proper 
grounding in such an esoteric epistemic domain.  This was less an issue of the science of 
genetics—indeed, many of the GPSIs had had earlier training in genetics that spurred their 
interest in the field—than of its clinical application.  Geneticists saw clinical genetics as a field 
characterized by its breadth and its depth; consequently codification of the knowledge inevitably 
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glazed over its subtleties.   
Safe clinical conduct, then, required in-depth understanding of the field; but more than 
this, it required immersion in the practice of genetics, within the collegiate atmosphere of the 
genetics department.  A geneticist in Site D put it like this: 
“There‟s a lot of learning by osmosis, and a lot of the clinical meeting isn‟t relevant to [the 
GPSI] because we‟re discussing results and stuff, but there are little grains of sand in there 
that he could pick out, and it‟s just being absorbed into the system. […] It‟s terribly 
difficult.  Cancer [genetics] is terribly difficult because there are very few families that you 
look at and say, „That‟s easy, this is definitely moderate risk‟.  There are lots of families 
where you think, „Mm, I wonder‟, and so we spend quite a lot of time trying to clarify 
family histories, getting more information to make a decision one way or the other.  
There‟s a lot of art in there as well as science and I think that just comes from doing it time 
and time again.  I‟m sure I get things wrong.  I‟m absolutely certain I‟ve missed things, but 
that‟s why we have the meeting, specifically to discuss people with difficult family histories, 
where you think, „This doesn‟t quite conform‟.” 
In this understanding, good clinical-genetic practice was an intrinsically collective endeavour, with 
applied genetic knowledge located in the collective wisdom of the full complement of clinical-
genetics professionals, from genetic counsellors to consultant geneticists, acquired over many 
years.  This, crucially, excluded almost by definition the possibility of good-quality clinical 
practice by a GPSI, at least if that GPSI was based outside the clinical-genetics department. 
Consequently, the plans of the GPSI in Site D for autonomous clinics, to which GPs 
would refer patients in lieu of referral to the clinical-genetics department, caused considerable 
concern to geneticists here.  They made it clear that they would audit every decision made by the 
GPSI, even in apparently innocuous cases, and encouraged the GPSI to become more involved 
with the day-to-day working of the department: 
“There are very specific issues in clinical genetics and we trained for a long time, so it 
seemed strange for somebody to feel they can leap in and do our job with no extra training.  
So we sat down and said, „We think this is what you need to do.  You need to come along 
to clinics with us, you need to sit in and we need to supervise you, and you also need to be 
part of our department.  You need to be involved in the discussions‟.” (Geneticist, Site D) 
The GPSI agreed that attending clinical meetings and seminars in the department might be 
beneficial, but felt that other pressures on his time meant that he could not prioritize this.  For 
him, though, the concerns of the genetics department about the suitability of clinical-genetics 
practice to the GPSI role reflected a cultural difference between hospital-based and community-
based practitioners, as he reflected in his second interview: 
“They‟re used to a hierarchical, centrally planned, centrally controlled service.  They have 
no experience of the concept of primary-care work, where people work on their own and 
take individual risks.  That was a concept they could not grasp: they felt that there had to 
be total control of the service. […] It‟s just a mindset.  As a GP you have to accept a small 
amount of risk.  If you see a patient, you say, „You have a 99 per cent chance of this, and 
there‟s a one per cent chance of this, and I‟m just going to sit on it and keep an eye on it‟.  
If you‟re a hospital consultant, you can say, „I‟ll investigate that one per cent and I‟ll do that 
extra test and if I‟ve got the facilities, I‟ll do that.  So I don‟t have to take that risk‟.  GPs 
have to learn to work with uncertainty and risk assessment.  Half their daily lives they do 
it.” 
Geneticists here accepted that this cultural difference was important, but considered that their 
own way of working provided a gold standard that GPSIs should not compromise: “GPs are on 
their own and they make a decision and stand by that decision, whereas we will often say, „Don‟t 
know, I‟ll get back to you‟, and I think it‟s probably a bit of a learning curve to accept that” 
(Geneticist, Site D). 
Consequently in this site, there was overt conflict between the genetics department and the 
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GPSI.  In Site C, geneticists were happier with the clinical work of the GPSI, provided under the 
auspices of the genetics department.  Elsewhere, geneticists made it clear that they would be 
happier with a non-clinical role for GPSIs.  This involved, for example, an educational function, 
with GPSIs providing seminars for their primary-care colleagues to introduce them to emergent 
clinical issues, or offering more basic information, such as referral criteria.  Some geneticists were 
concerned that to provide education without a clinical grounding represented a poor pedagogical 
model, but overall, most preferred this to a clinical alternative. 
This model of work represented a rather different construction of what constituted 
legitimate GPSI knowledge.  Rather than involving the „upward‟ extension of knowledge into the 
realm of esoteric clinical genetics, the key to the viability of an educational role—and more 
importantly, to its acceptability to geneticists—was that it drew upon a central component of the 
GP identity.  Rather than encroaching on genetics expertise, the knowledge base to be exploited 
was the GPSI‟s knowledge of the pressures of everyday primary-care practice.  As one geneticist 
from outside the four GPSI case-study sites put it, this was not something that was accessible to 
specialists: 
“The gap between primary and tertiary care is enormous.  It‟s difficult for me to go and 
speak to an audience of GPs.  They speak a different language, GPs are different types of 
doctors and what they want to know isn‟t always apparent [to us].” 
Consequently, the educational work of GPSIs was largely welcomed by specialists.  The regional 
screening co-ordinator in Site A explained how for primary-care practitioners, “there‟s a 
preconception that genetics is difficult and it‟s a specialised, rarefied subject, and it‟s not.  Part of 
what [the GPSI has] done is demystify, simplify and she‟s provided access into genetics for 
people.”  Even in Site D, geneticists stated that they were happy with the educational aspect of 
the GPSI‟s work.  GPSIs‟ commonality with their primary-care peers, then, was valued as a 
resource by geneticists, in a way that clinical interventions that impinged on the realm of clinical 
genetics were not. 
However, even here there were certain caveats for respondents from clinical-genetics 
departments.  Interventions to raise the knowledge of primary-care referrers were valued, but 
there were concerns that this should not lead to GPSIs themselves taking genetics inquiries from 
other GPs.  Once again, a key concern for geneticists was that GPSIs should not disrupt the 
established relationship between referrer and specialist by becoming an informal triaging 
mechanism.  The line between education and practice here was thin and unstable, and it was 
difficult for GPSIs to manage the boundary between acting as knowledge „conduits‟ without 
emerging as an authoritative source of that knowledge themselves.  The more politically sensitive 
GPSIs, though, recognized the importance of making this distinction as clear as possible: 
“I‟ve been quite careful in trying to set up a clinical-governance structure, so that things 
with guidelines, I‟m happy to sort. […] But I don‟t want to be in the position of giving 
people advice, so I‟ve been checking, probably even more than I need to.  Any queries I‟ll 
pass on to the consultant.  I‟d still receive a copy, but even if it was something very simple, 
I might give some advice first off, but anything I‟m not so sure of, I always discuss with the 
consultant.” (GPSI, Site A) 
Towards jurisdictional closure 
GPSI contributions valued by geneticists thus seemed to be those which drew on a knowledge 
base that derived from GPSIs‟ status as generalists, rather than from their specialist interest.  In 
Site C, where the GPSI did carry out clinical work, this was under the supervision of the clinical-
genetics department, which triaged potential GPSI patients as well as incorporating the GPSI 
within its clinical-governance framework: 
“One of my sessions I go over and see the geneticist, run through the clinic, have a general 
chat with him, and then another session I‟m doing it and often he‟s happy for me to do it 
on my own.  But everything is run through and sorted and if I have any questions I bring 
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them up when I see him in between.” (GPSI, Site C) 
In Site C, this arrangement seemed mutually acceptable.  At the end of the pilot period, 
geneticists were willing to support the GPSI on an ongoing basis.  In Site B, the educational 
intervention designed by the GPSI was always intended as a one-off, and so the question of 
continued funding never arose.  In Site A, the genetics service supported the GPSI in her 
successful bid to the PCT for continued funding.  The tensions in Site D between the geneticists 
and the GPSI over his independent approach to clinical work, however, were never resolved, and 
when pilot funding ceased here, the geneticists refused to support the GPSI‟s bid to the PCT, 
effectively scuppering any chance of ongoing funding. 
Asked about the potential long-term utility of GPSIs, geneticists tended to question the 
sustainability of a clinical role, for the reasons detailed above, and also on account of the relative 
expense of a medical practitioner compared to the greater skill mix of a clinical-genetics 
department.1  Despite their concerns about the relationship between practice and pedagogy, most 
were willing to countenance an educational role for GPSIs.  Two other roles for GPSIs, though, 
were suggested most enthusiastically by respondents from clinical-genetics departments.  Firstly, 
GPSIs were seen to have value as primary-care representatives who might attend committees 
pertaining to genetic issues and provide the perspective of working GPs.  This kind of role had 
been performed by the GPSIs in Sites A, B and C, filling vacant places on such committees to 
which it had been hard to attract GPs.  Secondly, geneticists advocated a role for GPSIs in the 
ongoing management of adult chronic diseases with genetic causation in the community, an area 
in which geneticists perceived existing clinical genetics provision as deficient.  As a geneticist who 
related to a GPSI in a non-case-study site described, these two roles offered clear “added value” 
deriving from GPSIs‟ status as GPs, allowing them to wield influence (in collaboration with 
geneticists) to improve protocols and pathways: 
“To begin with, I wasn‟t convinced that [GPSI] was a good model because I thought, „It‟s 
an expensive counsellor‟.  But having worked with the patient pathways and worked 
through the education, I think that‟s where the power of the GPs with special interest is: 
that we can change the patient pathways, we can change the flow of patients, we can get 
into the GP mindset, in a way that secondary and tertiary care can‟t.” 
For geneticists, then, the long-term value of the GPSI was as an ally in influencing the strategic 
organization of the health service, providing a perspective that had the legitimacy and authenticity 
of coming from primary care, but which would complement geneticists‟ own efforts to wield 
influence (note the use of the first-person plural in the excerpt above).  For geneticists, this was 
where a truly valuable and legitimate contribution lay. 
Discussion 
We see above two rather different perspectives on the proper role for a GPSI in genetics.  GPSIs 
themselves largely wished to extend their expertise „upwards‟ into the realm of clinical genetics, 
with a view to practice.  Geneticists were less keen on this idea, seeing clinical genetics as a field 
ill-suited to the autonomous practice of GPSIs, preferring instead roles which drew upon GPSIs‟ 
status and knowledge as GPs, and their commonality with other GPs.  Across the four case-study 
sites, it was the geneticists‟ interpretation of the legitimate role that won the day, through 
negotiation (as in Sites A and to some extent C), or coercion (as in Site D). 
Implicit in the discussions of the nature of clinical-genetic knowledge and practice was a 
contestation that echoes much recent literature on the sociology of the medical profession.  
GPSIs saw the role as an opportunity to practise in a field from which they had previously been 
                                                 
1 Similar concerns have been raised about the financial viability of GPSIs in other clinical fields 
(Coast, Noble, Noble, Horrocks, Asim, Peters et al., 2005). 
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excluded, and thus made claims to their „competence‟ (Sanders & Harrison, 2008) to do this 
work.  Geneticists‟ counter-arguments highlighted the indeterminacy of their knowledge (cf. 
Hibbert et al., 2003; Mclaughlin & Webster, 1998), and the need for immersion in day-to-day 
clinical-genetics work to achieve sufficient expertise to practise safely.  In this way, geneticists‟ 
conceptions of the legitimacy of the existing jurisdictional boundary went to the very heart of 
their professional project, by locating expertise in lengthy professional training and ongoing 
interaction with other experts—defined relationally (Foley & Faircloth, 2003) through comparison 
with the „go-it-alone‟ model of general practice.  This arose less from the esoteric nature of 
theoretical genetics knowledge than from the indeterminacy of applied clinical judgement, which 
relied in part on accumulated collective knowledge and learning by “osmosis,” as the geneticist in 
Site D put it.  It was this relationship of practice to science, rather than the science itself, that 
defined the expertise of the (sub)profession.  Such expertise could not be formalized into routine 
guidelines and protocols, and it could not be detached from the collective wisdom of the clinical-
genetics department.  GPSIs‟ ambitions to practise clinical genetics independently thus ran 
against the grain of geneticists‟ professional identity, and so in contrast to, for example, the 
willingness found among GPs to transfer what they consider to be routinizable work to practice 
nurses over whom they retain considerable control (Charles-Jones et al., 2003), clinical geneticists 
were loath to accede to such ambitions.  This construction of genetics knowledge reflects certain 
phenomenological accounts of the nature of expertise (e.g. Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Sandberg, 
2000). 
For GPSIs, meanwhile, this was more a matter of cultural differences than a quality 
intrinsic to clinical-genetics knowledge.  Again, GPSIs defined their legitimacy relationally.  A 
degree of managed risk was inherent in general practice, and this was no obstacle to the 
competent practice of certain aspects of clinical genetics.  In the three cases where the GPSIs had 
wished to carry out some clinical-genetics work, it was clear that a keenness to extend their 
clinical competence was central to their motivation.  Geneticists‟ view, that the foundation of the 
GPSI role should be the knowledge and commonality derived from generalism, implied a rather 
different construction of the appropriate division of labour within the health service, reflecting 
their own socialization and the indeterminate knowledge it brought (Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2001), as well as their beliefs about the irreducible and collective nature of their expertise.  It 
should be noted that an educational/leadership/liaison role was what the Department of Health 
had primarily envisaged for genetics, too, though it left open the option of a clinical component 
to their work.  There was thus no strong pressure from policymakers for geneticists to cede more 
control to GPSIs. 
Wider institutional pressures were also implicated in the re-establishment of a relatively 
conservative division of labour in these cases.  Whilst the prevailing momentum of British policy 
is towards the creation of primary-care-based services, to offer a „patient-centred‟ alternative 
„closer to home‟ than traditional hospital provision (e.g. Secretary of State for Health, 2006), 
genetics is not a high-priority area for this kind of shift.  Indeed, the focus on moving provision 
in other fields may have contributed to the lack of impetus from PCTs in our four sites, where 
respondents frequently mentioned the disengagement of primary-care managers from the field of 
genetics.  There was, therefore, no strong „pull‟ from primary care in relation to these posts, and 
as we saw in Site D, geneticists‟ privileged professional position meant that they retained power 
of veto over any moves to redistribute responsibilities.  The „push‟ from clinical genetics 
departments was limited, in the case of GPSIs, to educational and liaison activities that might 
promote genetics within primary care without undermining specialists‟ roles.  This analysis points 
to the need to remain cognisant of institutional forces in any account of professional-
jurisdictional disputes.  Mizrachi and Shuval (2005, p.1658) state, quite correctly, that “knowledge 
and professional conduct are reflected and refracted by the agent‟s daily practice, and the 
contours of boundaries are shaped by local forces.”  Nevertheless, it is important not to write out 
the role of structural forces in accounts of such agency, including, for example, the somewhat 
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capricious influence of policy in this field. 
From this study, the intra-professional boundary seems every bit as entrenched as inter-
professional boundaries, between medicine and related professions, studied elsewhere (Norris, 
2001; Foley & Faircloth, 2003; Hibbert et al., 2003; Mizrachi & Shuval, 2005).  Indeed, geneticists 
tended to include a different profession—genetic counsellors—within their epistemic community 
where they explicitly excluded GPSIs.  Undoubtedly, this was partly because of the focus of our 
study (on an intra-professional boundary) and the nature of the challenge presented by policy, but 
it is also worth noting that the gap between primary-care-based generalists and hospital-based 
specialists is a profound one in many countries (e.g. Shortell et al., 2000).  In contrast to the 
boundaries between hospital-based medical specialities, then, what distinguishes general practice 
from genetics is not only specialism, but also organization, status, relationship to the NHS (as 
contractor rather than employee) and gatekeeping function.  NHS „modernization‟ efforts have 
included attempts to raise the status of GPs relative to specialists, but our study reminds us that 
the power over knowledge and jurisdiction retained by specialists means that fundamental 
reforms to the division of labour are likely to be achieved only consensually.  From micro-level 
data such as these it would be unwise to generalize about the consequences for the profession of 
medicine itself, but certainly these findings do not contradict the notion that it may be 
fragmenting as a consequence of this kind of stratification. 
Finally, it should be noted that geneticists‟ reluctance to cede power should not be seen in 
purely instrumental terms.  Conflict-based accounts of professional-jurisdictional disputes tend to 
stress the role of power and money in such turf wars, and indeed there was a financial dimension 
to geneticists‟ protectiveness, with the financing of genetics services set to move from block 
contracts to „payment by results‟ in the near future.2  This does not, however, preclude an 
account which sees geneticists‟ self-interest as aligned with the interests of patients, and their 
claims to exclusive knowledge as sincere (Scott, 2008).  It is not for us to make this judgement.  
In general terms, though, we would suggest that any presumption that professional resistance of 
this sort represents an awkward and obstinate medical speciality flexing its muscles to block the 
progressive reforms of the state‟s „modernization‟ agenda is not necessarily justified. 
Conclusion 
By looking at the way in which a threat to established divisions of knowledge and labour between 
subprofessions played out, and closure was achieved, our analysis has sought to link the 
discursive strategies used by professions in defence of their jurisdictions to the substantive 
challenges presented by health-service reforms of the kind precipitated by „modernization‟ in the 
UK and similar policies elsewhere.  This highlights how such legitimatory discourses are 
bolstered or diminished by wider institutional forces, and gives some feel for the parameters that 
will govern the success or failure of policymakers‟ efforts to reconfigure the professional division 
of labour, and of professionals‟ own attempts to enact or resist such agenda.  On a theoretical 
level, we signal how (sub)professional claims to a legitimate monopoly on knowledge and 
jurisdiction, premised on an understanding of the collective manner in which scientific 
knowledge is translated into clinical expertise, interacts with resilient institutionalized power 
differentials to facilitate resistance to policy- and individual-level challenges to the professional 
division of labour, and ensure that the reforms of modernization reproduce, rather than 
reconfigure, existing structures of professional control.  As such, our analysis is likely transferable 
to other settings in which such knowledge and power differentials exist, though caution is 
                                                 
2 This shift will mean that income to clinical-genetics departments will be on a per capita basis, 
rather than a fixed sum, potentially creating an incentive to retain lower-risk patients as a source 
of revenue. 
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required given the relative narrowness of our empirical data, and the esoteric nature of clinical 
genetics as a field of study. 
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